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I construct a secure multi-party scheme to compute a classical function by a succinct use of a
specially designed fault-tolerant random polynomial quantum error correction code. This scheme
is secure provided that (asymptotically) strictly greater than five-sixths of the players are honest.
Moreover, the security of this scheme follows directly from the theory of quantum error correcting
code, and hence is valid without any computational assumption. I also discuss the quantum-classical
complexity-security tradeoff in secure multi-party computation schemes and argue why a full-blown
quantum code is necessary in my scheme.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Lx, 03.67.Hk, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum computers are more powerful than classical
computers in a number of applications such as integer
factorization [1], database search [2] and secret key dis-
tribution [3,4]. Besides, careful use of entanglement re-
duces the multi-party communication complexity of cer-
tain functions [5] and allows secret sharing [6]. On the
other hand, certain post-modern cryptographic applica-
tions, including bit commitment [7] and ideal two-party
secure computation [8] are impossible if the cheater has
a quantum computer. Thus, it is important to inves-
tigate the power and limitation of quantum computers.
Moreover, the quantum versus classical and security ver-
sus complexity tradeoffs for certain multi-party compu-
tational tasks deserve in-depth study.
In this Paper, I analyze the quantum versus classi-
cal and security versus complexity tradeoffs in secure
multi-party computation. In secure multi-party compu-
tation, n players each with a private classical input xi
want to compute a commonly agreed classical function
z = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) in such a way that (i) all play-
ers either know the value of z or abort after detecting
a cheater/eavesdropper, (ii) no one can gain information
on the private input of an honest player except those
logically following z, and (iii) a limited number of cheat-
ing players cannot alter the final outcome z. Moreover,
the above three conditions hold even if all cheaters and
eavesdroppers cooperate.
Secure multi-party computation can be used as a basic
building block for a number of extremely useful protocols
including secure election and anonymous messages broad-
cast. Thus, it is important to devise a secure multi-party
computation scheme that tolerates as many cheaters as
possible on the one hand, and requires as few communi-
cation between the players on the other.
Several classical secure multi-party computation
schemes existed in literature. The security of some of
these schemes [9] are based on either the security of cer-
tain (classical) oblivious transfer or (classical) bit com-
mitment protocols. Hence, their methods are insecure
if a cheating player has unlimited computational power.
Later on, Ben-Or et al. [10] and Chaum et al. [11] in-
dependently proposed multi-party computation methods
based on a distributed computing version of the so-called
(k, n)-secret sharing scheme [12]. Their schemes are un-
conditionally secure provided that less than one third
players cheat. This is true even when the cheaters co-
operate. Besides, the one third cheating player bound
is tight among all classical protocols which allow secret
communications between any two players [10]. Later on,
Rabin and Ben-Or showed that if each player can broad-
cast a message to all other players and that each pair of
players can communicate secretly, then there is an un-
conditionally secure way to compute z if less than a half
of the players cheat [13]. The one half cheating player
bound is tight among all classical schemes which allow
secret communications between any two players as well
as public broadcasting [13].
How much resources is required in classical condition-
ally secure multi-party computation? In all classical
schemes known to date, the n players must communi-
cate securely with others. Hence, n(n− 1)/2 classical
secure communication channels are required. Suppose
each player has a private input of length k, then ini-
tially, they have to distribute their private inputs via
certain secret sharing schemes. To do so, each player
has to send out O(nk) bits. Thus, O(n2k) bits of (se-
cret) classical communications are necessary for the ini-
tial setup in the whole system. To perform distributed
computation, up to O(n2k) bits of (secret) communica-
tions and computation per arithmetical operation are re-
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quired [10,13]. In addition, to verify that every player’s
secret input is correctly distributed in the secret shar-
ing scheme, an extra O(n3k) bits of communications are
needed [10,11,13]. Since the number of secret communi-
cation channels scales quadratically with the number of
players, classical secure multi-party computation is rarely
used in practice for more than, say, ten players [14]. In
fact, the classical schemes by Ben-Or et al. and Chaum
et al., being generic, are design primarily to point out the
plausibility of secure multi-party computation.
II. THE QUANTUM SECURE MULTI-PARTY
COMPUTATION SCHEME
Now, let me report a quantum secure multi-party
computation scheme that requires fewer communication
channels and resources at the expense of tolerating fewer
cheaters. Without lost of generality, I may assume that
the private input for each player as well as the output
of the function f are chosen from a finite field Fq some
prime q. My scheme goes as follows:
1. All players agree on a common computational basis
for quantum computation, an exponentially small
security parameter e > 0, as well as two ran-
dom polynomial quantum error correcting codes
(QECCs) C1 and C2 [15]. In particular, they choose
C1 to be the [[n, 1, d]]q code where the prime q > n,
and 3d ≤ n+2. More precisely, C1 encodes each
qary quantum register |a0〉 into n qary quantum
registers
∑q−1
a1,a2,...,ad−1=0
⊗n
i=1 |a0 + a1yi + a2y2i +
· · ·+ ad−1yd−1i 〉/q(d−1)/2 where yi are distinct non-
zero elements in Fq. The distance of this code is
d and hence it can correct up to δ ≡ ⌊d−12
⌋
er-
rors.1 Furthermore, I denote the [[n, 1, d]]q QECC
|a0〉 7−→
∑q−1
a1,a2,...,an−d+1=0
⊗n
i=1 |a0+a1yi+a2y2i +
· · · + an−d+1yn−d+1i 〉/q(n−d+1)/2 by C˜1. In addi-
tion, C2 is chosen to be the [[4d
′+1, 1, 2d′+1]]q ran-
dom polynomial QECC [15] whose fidelity of quan-
tum computation using imperfect devices is greater
than 1−e. (Since the random polynomial QECC C2
has a fault-tolerant implementation [15], thus, by
concatenate coding, the threshold theorem in fault-
tolerant quantum computation guarantees the ex-
istence of such a QECC C2 [15–17].) As we shall
see later on, the choice of the value of the distance
d only affect the number of cheaters that can be
tolerated by the scheme.
2. Each player sets up a quantum channel with a cen-
tral routing station. He/She may establish relay
stations along each quantum channel in such a way
that the noise level in each quantum channel seg-
ment is small enough to perform entanglement pu-
rification. (See Refs. [18–20] for details.) Further-
more, each player also has access to a classical pub-
lic unjammable channel for broadcasting.
3. The players, central routing channel and relay sta-
tions separately prepare a few copies of the state
|Φ〉 ≡ ∑q−1k=0 |kk〉/
√
q. They encode each copy
using QECC C2, and share these encoded state
|Φ〉 between the two ends of each quantum com-
munication channel segment. Then, they per-
form fault-tolerant entanglement purification pro-
cedure as discussed in Refs. [19,20] on these shared
states. Afterwards, these possibly impure encoded
states |Φ〉 shared between each channel segment
from one player to another are connected together
by quantum teleportation [4,18,21]. Finally, each
pair of players test the purity of their shared en-
coded states |Φ〉 by a variation of the fault-tolerant
random hashing technique described in Ref. [4].
(Readers may refer to Appendices A and B for de-
tail description of the teleportation and the random
hashing procedures, respectively.) They proceed to
step 4 only if the random hashing test is passed for
each pair of players. And in this case, each pair of
players will share a number of almost perfect en-
coded logical state |Φ〉. The entanglement shared
between each pair of players in this way can then be
used to securely transport states among themselves
in step 4. Clearly, shared |Φ〉 is not the only possi-
ble way to establish such an entanglement. In fact,
one may replace the state |Φ〉 in this scheme by an
EPR pair. Nevertheless, the scheme will become
slightly complicated after such an replacement for
one has to teleport qary instead of binary quantum
registers in step 4.
4. Let xi be the private classical input of player i,
then he/she prepares s = O(log 1e ) copies of the
state |xi〉. He/She also prepares a number of preset
quantum registers |0〉 that will be used later on in
the reversible quantum computation. Player i first
encodes each of his/her prepared quantum registers
using the QECC C1. Then, player i further encodes
the jth quantum register in each of his/her encoded
1The distance of this code is less than that reported in
Ref. [15]. Nonetheless, I still call this a random polyno-
mial code because this code closely resembles that reported
in Ref. [15].
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state using C2 and teleports the resultant quantum
registers to player j using their previously shared
encoded state |Φ〉 in step 3 for all j 6= i. He/She
also encodes each of the ith quantum register by C2
and keeps those quantum registers himself/herself.
All players keep their received quantum registers
private as well. And in what follows, I use the sub-
script “L” below the state ket to denote a state that
is encoded and distributed among the n players us-
ing this procedure. In addition, the players also
prepare a number of preset quantum registers |0〉,
encode it first by C˜1 and then by C2. The play-
ers then distribute these encoded preset registers
among themselves in a similar way as in sharing
their private inputs. And I use the subscript “L˜”
below the state ket to denote such an encoded and
distributed state. States |0〉L and |0〉L˜ shall be used
as preset registers during the reversible computa-
tion in step 6.
5. In order to make sure that everyone follows step 4
honestly, a player j (the verifier) may challenge a
randomly chosen player i (the prover) using the
fault-tolerant random parity check method similar
to that used in Ref. [4].
More precisely, player j publicly announces a
sequence {ck}sk=1 of integers in Fq such that∑s
k=1 ck = 0. Then, every player is required to help
player j to compute the random parity
∑s
k=1 ckxik
by distributed fault-tolerant quantum computation
(FTQC), where xik denotes the state of the kth
copy of the private input of player i. Clearly, the
choice of QECCs C1 and C2 enable us to perform
the above quantum computation in a fault-tolerant
way without any measurement and ancilla [15]. Be-
sides, the method of distributing the private input
state in step 4 allows the players to perform the
above FTQC in a distributed manner without any
communications between them.
To verify if the result computed (which I call it the
random parity) is equal to zero, all players measure
and publicly announce their measurement outcome
along their commonly agreed computational basis
on their corresponding C2 encoded quantum reg-
isters that encode the random parity. Because C1
is a [[n, 1, d]]q random polynomial QECC, the mea-
surement results of the players correspond to the
classical [n, d, n−d+1]q Reed-Solomon encoding of
the random parity. Naturally, they continue only if
the random parity inferred from this classical Reed-
Solomon encoding is zero. This verification process
has to repeat O(log 1e ) times for each proving player
i so as to guarantee security.
In addition, all players use a similar distributed
fault-tolerant random parity checking technique to
verify the purity of the distributed encoded pre-
set quantum registers |0〉L and |0〉L˜ among them-
selves. They proceed to step 6 only when all the
measurement results are consistent with the as-
sumption that there is no cheater or eavesdropper
around. Thus, in order to establish the required se-
curity, O(log 1e ) private input states prepared and
distributed in step 4 are wasted. (An alternative
way to perform the random parity check measure-
ment is to ask the players to teleport their shares
of the encoded random parity quantum registers to
the verifier. Then, the verifier makes the appropri-
ate measurement and publicly announces the out-
come.)
6. To compute the commonly agreed classical func-
tion z = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn), the n players perform
distributed FTQC on their received quantum par-
ticles. The players keep every quantum state except
the final result private.
To be precise, they first decompose the classical
function f into a commonly agreed composition of
elementary operators. Each elementary operator
is in the form of (i) register-wise addition |x〉 7→
|x+ a〉, (ii) register-wise multiplication |x〉 7→ |ax〉,
(iii) generalized C-NOT |x, y〉 7→ |x, x + y〉 and
(iv) generalized Toffoli gate |x, y, z〉 7→ |x, y, z+xy〉,
for some fixed a 6= 0 [22].
At this point, each player should have r =
O(log 1e ) < s remaining quantum registers dis-
tributed among themselves. Moreover, all the re-
maining distributed quantum states of an honest
player, upon quantum error correction, should be
identical. Clearly, the choice of the random polyno-
mial QECCs C1 and C2 together with the private
secure distribution method in step 4 allow the play-
ers to perform the first three types of elementary
operators without any measurement or communi-
cation between the players [15]. Thus, they can
perform the fault-tolerant operation on the r re-
maining distributed quantum registers one by one.
And in this way, they end up with having r identi-
cal resultant states if they are honest.
To perform the fourth type of elementary oper-
ator, namely, a generalized Toffoli gate on the r
remaining distributed encoded states, they do the
following. First, the players collectively synthesize
the distributed state
∑q−1
a,b=0 |a, b, ab〉L/q3/2 among
themselves using their verified distributed states
|0〉L˜ by a procedure based on that in Ref. [17] as
follows:
|0, 0, 0, 0〉L˜
7−→ 1
q2
q−1∑
a,b,c,k=0
|a, b, c, k〉L (1a)
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7−→ 1
q2
q−1∑
a,b,c,k=0
ω−kcq |a, b, c, k〉L (1b)
7−→ 1
q2
q−1∑
a,b,c,k=0
ωk(ab−c)q |a, b, c, k〉L (1c)
7−→ 1
q5/2
q−1∑
a,b,c,k,x=0
ωk(ab−c+x)q |a, b, c〉L ⊗ |x〉L˜ , (1d)
where ωq is a primitive qth root of unity.
To arrive at Eq. (1a) in a fault-tolerant man-
ner, each player i simply has to perform the
following local Fourier transformation |a〉 7−→∑q−1
b=0 ω
miab
q |b〉/
√
q on his/her corresponding quan-
tum registers, where mi ∈ Fq is a unique solu-
tion for the system of equations
∑n
i=1 mi = 1 and∑n
i=1 miyi =
∑n
i=1 miy
2
i = · · · =
∑n
i=1 miy
n−1
i =
0. I denote this fault-tolerant transformation by F.
In fact, Appendix C shows that F|0〉L =
∑q−1
k=0 |k〉L˜
and F|0〉L˜ =
∑q−1
k=0 |k〉L. And then, Aharonov
and Ben-Or tell us how to arrive at Eqs. (1b) by
fault-tolerant controlled-phase-shift gate without
any communication between the players [15]. More
precisely, each player i applies |a, b〉 7−→ ωpiabq |a, b〉
to their share of the third and fourth quantum reg-
isters where pi ∈ Fq satisfies
∑n
i=1 pi = −1 and∑n
i=1 piyi =
∑n
i=1 piy
2
i = · · · =
∑n
i=1 piy
2d
i = 0.
Subsequently, arriving at Eq. (1c) from Eq. (1b)
requires the fault-tolerant controlled-controlled-
phase-shift gate |a, b, c〉L 7→ ωabcq |a, b, c〉L. And
for the random polynomial code C1 with 3d ≤
n+2, this operation is achieved when each player
i applies the controlled-controlled-phase-shift gate
|a, b, c〉 7→ ωriabcq |a, b, c〉 to his/her corresponding
share of the encoded first, second and third quan-
tum registers, where ri ∈ Fq is the solution (not
necessarily unique unless 3d+1 = n) of the sys-
tem of equations
∑n
i=1 ri = 1, and
∑n
i=1 riyi =∑n
i=1 riy
2
i = · · · =
∑n
i=1 riy
3d
i = 0. Finally,
to arrive at Eq. (1d) from Eq. (1c) in a fault-
tolerant way, the players simply apply the same
local Fourier transform F that creates Eq. (1a) to
their share of the fourth quantum register. (Again,
the proof can be found in Appendix C.) In sum-
mary, the players can evolve their share of quantum
states to Eq. (1d) in a fault-tolerant manner with-
out any measurement, communications or the use
of ancillary particles.
After the players have evolved their quantum par-
ticles to the distributed state in Eq. (1d), they
measure their share of the fourth encoded quan-
tum register along the commonly agreed compu-
tational basis and then publicly announce their
measurement results. In this way, they end up
having a classical [n, n− d+1, d]q Reed-Solomon
code and after error correction, they can infer
the measurement outcome of the fourth encoded
quantum register along the commonly agreed com-
putational basis. Suppose the inferred measure-
ment result is λ, then the state ket of the re-
maining three distributed encoded quantum reg-
isters becomes
∑q−1
a,b,c,k=0 ω
k(ab−c+λ)
q |a, b, c〉L/q2 =∑q−1
a,b=0 |a, b, ab + λ〉L/q. So, by applying a fault-
tolerant generalized C-NOT gate depending on the
measurement result λ, they eventually synthesize
the state
∑q−1
a,b=0 |a, b, ab〉L/q collectively.
At this point, using their newly synthesized dis-
tributed encoded state
∑q−1
a,b=0 |a, b, ab〉L/q as an-
cilla, the n players implement the generalized Tof-
foli gate in a fault-tolerant manner using a varia-
tion of the Gottesman’s method in Ref. [23]. (See
also Ref. [17] for details.) More precisely, they per-
form the following transformation using a number
of fault-tolerant generalized C-NOT gates and a
fault-tolerant F gate
1
q2
q−1∑
a,b,c=0
|x, y, z, a, b, ab〉L
7−→ 1
q3/2
q−1∑
a,b,c=0
ωzcq |x− a, y − b〉L ⊗ |c〉L˜
⊗ |a, b, z + ab〉L . (2)
Now, the n players measure their shares of the first
three encoded registers along the commonly agreed
computational basis. Regarding as classical Reed-
Solomon codes, their publicly announced measure-
ment outcomes can then be used to infer the (quan-
tum) measurement results of the first three regis-
ters along the commonly agreed computational ba-
sis. Suppose the inferred measurement results of
the first three registers are λ1, λ2 and λ3, respec-
tively. Then, by adding λ1 to the fourth register,
λ2 to the fifth register, and λ1y+λ2x−λ1λ2 to the
sixth register, they get the state ωλ3zq |x, y, z+xy〉L.
Finally, they obtain the state |x, y, z + xy〉L, which
is the result of a generalized Toffoli operation, by
applying a suitable phase-shift gate in the sixth
register and then followed by another controlled-
controlled-phase-shift operator to the first and sec-
ond registers. (As I have discussed previously, play-
ers may perform these operations without any com-
munication because of the choice of the QECC C1
and C2 together with the fact that λ1, λ2 and λ3
are classical data.)
To ensure accuracy, they perform the above pro-
cess r times to the r supposedly identical signal
states. In this way, they end up with implement-
ing r identical generalized Toffoli operators if all
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players are honest. (At this point, readers may
wonder why I do not check the purity of ancil-
lary state
∑q−1
a,b=0 |a, b, ab〉L/q directly. The rea-
son is that random parity checking does not work
for this ancillary state because the state of the
untested particles will be altered by the test it-
self. Readers may also ask why I do not apply the
fault-tolerant Fourier transformation gate to obtain∑q−1
k=0 |k〉L from |0〉L. The reason is that all known
fault-tolerant Fourier transformation gate for the
[[n, 1, d]]q QECC C1 with 3d ≤ n+2 to date requires
collective measurements on the encoded quantum
registers and hence is liable to error in the pres-
ence of cheaters.) (An alternative method to per-
form the required measurement is to assign once
and for all a randomly chosen player for each of
the r = O(log 1e ) supposedly identical signal states.
Whenever it comes to a measurement, players tele-
port their states to be measured to the correspond-
ing assigned player who then makes the necessary
measurement and publicly announces the measure-
ment outcome.)
7. In order to make sure that the players indeed follow
the distributed FTQC in step 6 honestly, they carry
out the random parity verification test O(log 1e )
times to their final state using the same method
as described in step 5. Finally, to obtain the value
of z = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn), the n players separately
measure their share of quantum registers that en-
codes the value of z along the commonly agreed
computational basis, and then publicly announce
their measurement outcomes. Then, they infer the
value of z using standard classical Reed-Solomon
code error correction.
III. THE SECURITY OF THE QUANTUM
SCHEME
Now, I claim that the above scheme correctly computes
the classical function z = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) with a proba-
bility 1−ℓe for some fixed constant ℓ ≥ 1, provided that
no more than δ players cheat. Besides, those δ ≡ ⌊ d−12
⌋
cheaters know nothing about the private inputs of every
honest player and they cannot alter the final outcome z.
These claims are true even if all cheaters cooperate and
have unlimited computational power.
To prove the above claims, one observes that there are
four possible ways for the above scheme to go wrong,
namely, the presence of noises, bad instruments, eaves-
droppers and cheating players. Remember that a cheater
may deliberately announce wrong measurement results
and thereby misleading others. Besides, one has to make
the most pessimistic assumption that all cheaters and
eavesdroppers cooperate and control everything except
the instruments in the laboratories of the honest play-
ers. The cheaters may even have unlimited computa-
tional power. Using the argument in Ref. [4], I first show
that we can safely neglect the effect of noises and bad
instruments. Since all steps in the above scheme are per-
formed in a fault-tolerant manner, the theory of FTQC
tells us that with probability 1−e we may regard the ef-
fect of noise and bad instruments simply affect the error
syndromes but not the quantum information encoded in
the states [15–17]. Besides, the theory of QECC tells us
that learning error syndromes give no information about
the quantum information encoded in the state [24,25].
Consequently, by restricting myself to the evolution of
quantum information contained in the encoded quantum
registers, I may analyze the behavior of the above scheme
in a noiseless environment from now on.
Then, it remains for me to show that no more than δ
cheaters can obtain partial information on the private in-
puts of some honest players. Besides, these cheaters can-
not alter the output of the classical function f . In order
to do so, one has to understand the function of each step
in the scheme first. Steps 2 and 3 are direct generaliza-
tion of the entanglement-based quantum key distribution
protocol proposed by Lo and Chau in Ref. [4]. The aim of
these two steps is to share almost perfect encoded state
|Φ〉 between any two pairs of players so that they can
teleport quantum states in a fault-tolerant manner from
one to another at a later time in step 4. Step 5 make sure
that every player follows step 4 to distribute his/her pri-
vate input as well as the preset quantum registers using
the QECCs C1 and C˜1. The actual computation is car-
ried out in step 6. And finally, they verify and measure
their computational result in step 7.
A. Private Inputs Of An Honest Player Is Secure Up
To Step 5 Of The Quantum Scheme
I have two cases to consider in order to show that
the δ ≡ ⌊d−12
⌋
cheaters obtain no information on the
private inputs of the honest players up to the random
parity verification in step 5 of the quantum scheme.
The first case is when the proving player i in step 5
is honest. In this case, the encoded state |Φ〉 shar-
ing scheme in step 3 between the proving player i and
all other honest players is a straight-forward generaliza-
tion of the quantum key distribution protocol of Lo and
Chau in Ref. [4]. More importantly, as stated in Ap-
pendix B, the random parity test in step 5 maps the
basis B = {∑q−1k=0 ωkbq |k, k + a〉/
√
q}a,b∈Fq to basis B up
to a global phase. Therefore, the proof of Lo and Chau in
Ref. [4] applies. In particular, they have already proved
that the fidelity of every encoded state |Φ〉 shared be-
tween any two honest players is at least 1− e even in
the presence of eavesdroppers and cheaters [4]. Then in
steps 4 and 5, eavesdroppers and cheaters can only access
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to the public classical communications between the hon-
est players. Fortunately, these classical messages contain
no information about the teleported quantum state [21].
Hence, no one apart from the sender and the receiver
knows the teleported state. Thus, these δ cheaters have
access to at most their share of δ quantum registers of
the distributed encoded state |xi〉L. Since the C1 is a
[[n, 1, d]]q QECC, the knowledge of the δ quantum regis-
ters in the hands of the cheaters contains no information
on the private input xi at all.
The second case is that the proving player i is dis-
honest. Clearly, the job of the dishonest player i is to
somehow mislead the other players into believing that
he/she is honest. More precisely, player i tries to de-
vise a method (possibly with the help of the other δ−1
cheaters in the system) so as to pass the verification
test in step 5 with a probability greater than 1−ℓe for
some fixed positive constant ℓ. Note that measuring ev-
ery quantum register of an arbitrary quantum codeword
of the [[n, 1, d]]q random polynomial QECC C1 along
the commonly agreed computational basis gives a clas-
sical [n, d, n−d+1]q Reed-Solomon codeword. Besides,
if the C1 encoded quantum state |Ψ〉 contains δ erro-
neous quantum registers, then after measuring along the
computational basis, we end up getting a classical Reed-
Solomon codeword with at most δ erroneous registers.
Since δ < n/4 [25,26], therefore if an error can be han-
dled by the QECC C1, the corresponding error after mea-
surement can be handled by the corresponding classical
Reed-Solomon code. Moreover, the coarse-grained mea-
surement, that is, process of measuring each quantum
register along the computational basis together with the
inference of quantum state from the Reed-Solomon code,
can be regarded as a projective measurement along the
C1 encoded computational basis on quantum state. And
now in the verification step 5, all the n−δ honest players
indeed measure the quantum states along the commonly
agreed computational basis. Besides, the random parity
check does not alter the state of the un-measured quan-
tum particles. Therefore, the coarse-grained measure-
ments performed by the honest players commute with
each other; and hence each coarse-grained measurement
result will in no way change the outcome of all subse-
quent measurements [4]. Thus, theoretically, the hon-
est players may push their coarse-grained measurement
forward to the time when the quantum states are just
prepared. Consequently, the probability that cheating
player i passes the quantum verification test in step 5 can-
not exceed the probability of passing a classical random
parity verification test in which player i is only allowed to
prepare only a classical mixture of states [4]. Clearly, the
probability that player i cheats and yet he/she passes the
classical verification test is no greater than 1/qr where r
is the number of independent rounds of tests performed.
Consequently, by repeating the quantum random parity
test logq
1
e times, the probability that player i cheats and
yet he/she passes the quantum verification test in step 5
is at most e. And once the quantum verification test is
passed, the fidelity of the remaining untested quantum
states as being a valid input |xi〉 is equal to 1− ℓe for
some constant ℓ independent of n and e. Thus, the en-
tropy of each of the untested quantum states is equal to
log q+ℓe. Hence, the cheaters have exponentially small
amount information on the private inputs of every honest
player [4]. And using a similar argument, I know that the
fidelity of the distributed preset quantum registers |0〉L
and |0〉L˜ is also equal to 1−ℓe.
Therefore, I conclude that if there are at most δ
cheaters around and that they choose to perform mea-
surements individually, then the probability that these
cheaters can obtain partial information on the private
inputs of the honest players is bounded from above by ℓe
for some fixed constant ℓ > 0 up to step 5 of the quantum
scheme.
In the event that the players choose to teleport their
random parity state to the verifier who then make the
necessary measurement, the proof of security up to step 5
is similar. Note that if the verifier is honest, then the
above proof applies. On the other hand, if the verifier
cheats, two possible things may happen. First, the ver-
ifier may wrongly announce an inconsistent result. But
leads to an immediate abortion of the scheme. Hence,
he/she cannot obtain any extra information on the pri-
vate input of an honest player. Second, the verifier may
turn a blind eye to a measurement result that is inconsis-
tent with the no cheater/eavesdropper assumption. Since
δ/n < 1/6, a non-zero fraction of the verifiers are hon-
est. So, after O(log 1e ) rounds of random parity tests, the
probability that the private input of an honest players
leaks out is less than ℓe for some fixed constant ℓ > 0 up
to step 5 of the quantum scheme.
Thus, I conclude that if there are at most δ cheaters
around and that the players choose to teleport the parti-
cles encoding the random parities to the verifiers before
making measurement, then the probability that cheaters
obtain partial information on the private input of an hon-
est player is less than ℓe for some fixed constant ℓ > 0.
B. Cheater Cannot Alter The Computation Result
Now, I proceed to show that these δ cheaters cannot
alter the outcome of the function evaluation f with a
probability greater than e in steps 6 and 7 of the quan-
tum scheme. Since one may regard any illegal quantum
manipulation by the δ cheaters as decoherence acting on
up to δ quantum registers in the QECC C1, the theory of
FTQC implies that any quantum manipulation by these
cheaters cannot alter the final outcome of the function
f . Nevertheless, the theory of FTQC assumes that all
measurements of the encoded quantum state and manip-
ulation of classical data are error free. So, it remains for
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me to show that measurement and classical data manip-
ulation by cheaters also cannot alter the outcome of the
function f .
Because of the choice of C1 and C2, there are two possi-
ble operations in the scheme that requires measurement
or classical message communication, namely, the verifi-
cation test and the generalized Toffoli gate. As I have
discussed previously, incorrect measurement or classical
message broadcasting in a verification test results in the
immediate abortion of the scheme. Hence, it cannot alter
the final output of the function f . So, it remains for me to
consider to case of a generalized Toffoli gate. Recall that
the generalized Toffoli gate is collectively synthesized by
the n players from the verified distributed encoded state
|0〉L˜ in step 6. Fortunately, if the players choose to per-
form their measurements individually, then all measure-
ment results in step 6 are in either the [n, d, n−d+1]q
or the [n, n−d, d]q Reed-Solomon code forms. Hence, the
δ cheaters cannot alter the measurement outcome and
hence the value of z.
On the other hand, if they choose to teleport their
states to their corresponding randomly assigned player,
then in order to pass the final random parity test in step 7
with a probability greater than e, the cheaters must ar-
range the state of the final outcome z = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn)
for each of the r = O(log 1e ) copies of quantum particles
to be almost identical. This is possible only when all the
r randomly assigned players who are responsible for mea-
surement cheat. Since the probability that all randomly
assigned players cheat is equal to
(
δ
n
)r
= O(e). Conse-
quently, the probability that the δ cheaters can alter the
final value of z without being detected is equal to ℓe for
some fixed positive constant ℓ.
C. Cheater Cannot Obtain Partial Information
During Distributed Computing Of The Function f
Although cheaters cannot alter the final outcome of
the computation with a probability greater than ℓe for
some fixed positive constant ℓ, readers may ask if these
cheaters can obtain partial information on the private in-
put of an honest player in steps 6 and 7. Now, I show that
this is not possible. Using the same argument as in Sub-
section III B together with the choice of [[n, 1, d]]q codes
C1 and C2, the only possible place for information leak-
age is the measurement performed by the players during
the implementation of a generalized Toffoli gate. And as
I have discussed in Subsection III B, if the players choose
to measure individually, then the δ cheaters cannot al-
ter the joint measurement result that is required during
the collective and distributive synthesis of the ancillary
state
∑q−1
a,b=0 |a, b, ab〉L/q as well as during the implemen-
tation of the generalized Toffoli gate. Moreover, theory
of QECC tells us that the value of these measurements
contains no information on the distributed encoded state
|x, y, z〉L. Recall that the δ cheaters have access only to
their shares of the entangled quantum state together with
the classical information on the measurement results on
the fault-tolerant generalized Toffoli gate. Since C1 is a
[[n, 1, d]]q QECC, these information alone is not enough
for the cheaters to obtain any information on |x, y, z〉L
and hence the private inputs of an honest player.
On the other hand, if the players choose to teleport
their corresponding states to the randomly assigned play-
ers before making measurements, then we cannot control
the action of a cheating assigned player. Nonetheless, by
looking into the synthesis scheme of the ancillary state∑q−1
a,b=0 |a, b, ab〉L used in step 6, the cheating assigned
player can only alter the third encoded quantum regis-
ter of this ancillary state. In other words, the cheating
assigned player can only, after error correction, alter the
state of the last quantum register in Eq. (2). So right
after all players teleported their corresponding quantum
registers to the cheating assigned player, the δ cheaters
control the first three encoded quantum registers together
with the shares of distributed encoded fourth, fifth and
sixth registers. Consequently, the reduced density ma-
trix of the quantum registers controlled by the cheating
assigned players is independent of x, y and z. Hence, it
is impossible for the δ cheaters to obtain partial informa-
tion of the private input of an honest player.
In summary, using the results in Subsections III A–
III C, I conclude that the quantum secure multi-party
computation scheme in Section II is secure provided that
no more than δ players cheat. Moreover, the security is
unconditional for it does not rely on any computational
assumption.
And in the alternative scheme that the players teleport
their quantum states to some once and for all randomly
chosen players and let these assigned players to make the
measurement, the proof that the δ cheaters cannot alter
the final outcome z and that they cannot obtain extra
information on the private input of an honest player is
similar.
IV. THE COMPLEXITY AND SECURITY
TRADEOFF BETWEEN THE QUANTUM AND
CLASSICAL SCHEMES
Clearly, the above quantum secure multi-party compu-
tation scheme requires O(n) quantum channels, a public
classical unjamable broadcasting channel, O(n2k log 1e )
bits of quantum and classical communications in order
to distribute and compute the classical function f , where
k is the length of each private input. Distributed FTQC
of register-wise addition, register-wise multiplication and
generalized C-NOT gate do not require any communica-
tion. And distributed FTQC of a generalized Toffoli gate
requires O(nk log 1e ) bits of classical messages broadcast,
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or equivalently, O(n2k log 1e ) bits of classical communi-
cations between the players if they choose to perform
their measurement individually. Distributed FTQC of a
generalized Toffoli gate requires O(nk log 1e ) bits of clas-
sical communications should they choose to teleport the
states and measure them collectively by the randomly
assigned players. Moreover, if classically non-distributed
computing f requires T timesteps and S space, then the
distributed quantum computing scheme in step 6 above
requires O(nT 1+ǫ) timesteps and O(nS log T ) space for
any ǫ > 0 [27]. Hence, the amount of communica-
tion required to distributed FTQC of a classical func-
tion f is bounded from above by O(n2kT 1+ǫ log 1e ) should
they use the alternative teleportation plus measurement
method. In contrast, the best classical secure multi-party
computation scheme known to date requires O(n2) com-
munication channels and O(n3kT ) bits of communica-
tions. Thus, the quantum secure multi-party computa-
tion scheme requires fewer channels and less computation
or communications than the best known classical algo-
rithm to date.
Nevertheless, the improvement of the quantum scheme
over the classical one comes with a price tag. Recall that
the maximum number of cheaters tolerated by this quan-
tum scheme is related to the maximum possible distance
d of a QECC that maps one qary quantum register to n
qary quantum registers. Since I am using the [[n, 1, d]]q
QECC with 3d ≤ n+2, my scheme can tolerate only
asymptotically up to strictly less than 1/6 cheaters. On
the other hand, the best known classical scheme is un-
conditionally secure provided that strictly greater than
one half of the players are honest. In other words, the
quantum scheme reported here trades security for com-
munication complexity.
V. FULL-BLOWN QUANTUM CODE IS
REQUIRED IN THE QUANTUM SCHEME
At this point, readers may question if a full-blown
QECC is required in this quantum scheme because phase
errors do not affect the final outcome z. Rather surpris-
ingly, the answer is yes. In fact, I shall show that if C
is a linear map sending one quantum register to n quan-
tum registers, then any two of the three conditions below
imply the third one:
1. C is a QECC correcting up to δ spin flip errors.
2. C is a QECC correcting up to δ phase shift errors.
3. The partial trace over any n−δ registers gives no
information on the initial unencoded wavefunction.
The theory of QECC implies that (1) and (2) ⇒ (3).
And now, I show that (1) and (3) ⇒ (2). The re-
maining case that (2) and (3) ⇒ (1) can be proven
in a similar way. I divide the n players into two
groups. Groups A and B have n−δ and δ players, re-
spectively. By Schmidt polar decomposition, the en-
coded normalized state
∑
k αk|k〉L can be written as
ρ =
∑
i,j,k,k′ αkαk′
√
λi(k)λj(k′)|ai(k)〉⊗|bi(k)〉〈aj(k′)|⊗
〈bj(k′)|, where |ai(k)〉 and |bi(k)〉 are eigenvectors of the
reduced density matrices as seen by groups A and B,
respectively. Hence, taking partial trace over group A,
condition (3) tells us that
TrA(ρ) =
∑
i,j,k,k′
αkαk′ 〈aj(k′)|ai(k)〉 |bi(k)〉〈bj(k′)| (3)
is independent of αk. This is possible only if |bi(k)〉 ≡ |bi〉
and
√
λi(k)λj(k′)〈aj(k′)|ai(k)〉 are independent of k for
all i, j. Condition (1) implies that
∑
i,j
√
λi(k)λj(k′)〈bi|S†|bj〉 〈ai(k)|S′|aj(k′)〉 = δk,k′ΛS,S′,
(4)
where S and S′ are spin flip operators such that each
acts on no more than δ quantum registers, and ΛS,S′ is
independent of k and k′ [24,25]. Since |bi〉 is independent
of k, Eq. (4) holds if one replaces S by a general quantum
error operator G which acts on no more than δ quantum
registers. Since groups A and B are arbitrarily chosen,
Eq. (4) is valid if one replaces S′ by G. Once again, since
|bi〉 is independent of k, I conclude that Eq. (4) is true
even if one replaces the two spin flip operators S and S′
by general quantum error operators G and G′ which act
on no more than δ quantum registers. Consequently, C is
a QECC correcting up to δ errors [24,25]. In particular,
condition (2) is valid.
VI. OUTLOOK
In summary, I have reported and proved the secu-
rity of a quantum secure multi-party scheme to compute
classical functions. The scheme makes essential use of
fault-tolerant quantum computation and a specially de-
signed quantum error correcting code. While the quan-
tum scheme tolerates only about one third the number of
cheaters as the best known classical scheme to date, it re-
quires asymptotically smaller amount of communication
between the players.
This scheme also tells us that higher dimensional CSS-
like quantum error correcting codes with fault-tolerant
implementation have far-reaching applications outside
the context of quantum mechanical computation. While
quantum code is not the only possible way to protect
quantum information during computation [28], cheating
players may do all the nasty things that only full-blown
quantum code can handle. Hence, quantum code is an
essential ingredient in this secure multi-party computa-
tion scheme. Moreover, no binary [[n, 1, d]]2 CSS code
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with d > n/7 is known to date. Thus, higher dimen-
sional quantum code [29] appears to be an essential in-
gredient in making my scheme to tolerate strictly less
than one sixth cheating players. Since fault-tolerant com-
putation of a general non-CSS-like code requires collec-
tive measurements [23], it seems likely that C1 should
be a CSS-like code [30]. Besides, by replacing the ran-
dom polynomial codes C1 and C2 by the correspond-
ing continuous quantum codes [31] of the form |a0〉 7−→∫
da1 da2 · · · dad−1
⊗n
i=1 |a0+a1yi+ · · ·+ad−1yd−1i 〉, my
scheme also works for continuous quantum variables.
Rains showed that no binary [[n, 1, 2δ+1]]2 quantum
code exists for δ > n+1 [32] and a simple modification of
the proofs of the optimality of the five quantum register
code in Refs. [25] and [26] shows that [[n, 1, d]]q codes
must satisfy d/n < 1/4. Thus, it may be possible to
design a QECC based secure multi-parity computation
scheme that tolerates up to a quarter cheaters. It is in-
structive to find such scheme out, if any.
It is also natural to ask if it is possible to extend this
scheme to perform multi-party computation of a quan-
tum function. That is, given a commonly agreed unitary
operator U as well as n private quantum states |xi〉, is it
possible to compute U⊗i |xi〉? Clearly, such a scheme ex-
ists if all the players are honest. The players may simply
modify the scheme in this Paper a little bit by dropping
out all the verification tests that check the identity of the
private inputs, final output, and the correct implementa-
tion of generalized Toffoli gates. Nevertheless, there is no
obvious way to use the random parity test to check the
validity of a general quantum state. Moreover, a player
may cheat by using the delay measurement tactics as in
the proof of the impossibility of quantum bit commit-
ment [7]. It is, therefore, of great interest to know if it is
possible to achieve quantum multi-party computation of
a quantum function in the presence of cheaters.
APPENDIX A: PROCEDURE OF TELEPORTING
A QARY STATE
The qary state quantum teleportation process goes
as follows: The sender and the receiver first share the
state |Φ〉 = ∑q−1k=0 |kk〉/
√
q before the sender makes a
joint measurement on the quantum state |Ψ〉 to be tele-
ported and his/her share of the state |Φ〉 along the basis
{∑q−1k=0 ωbkq |a, a + k〉/
√
q}a,b∈Fq} where ωq is a primitive
qth root of unity. Then, the sender informs the receiver
the measurement result. If the measurement outcome
is
∑q−1
k=0 ω
bk
q |a, a + k〉/
√
q, then the receiver may recon-
struct the quantum state |Ψ〉 by applying the unitary
transformation |x〉 7→ ωb(x−a)q |x − a〉 to his/her share of
the original state |Φ〉.
APPENDIX B: PROCEDURE OF THE RANDOM
PARITY/HASHING TEST
Let us consider the basis B = {∑q−1k=0 ωkbq |k, k +
a〉/√q}a,b∈Fq . Clearly, one may transform from one ba-
sis state ket to another by local unitary operations alone.
And I denote the set of all such transformations by T .
Furthermore, the register-wise generalized C-NOT oper-
ation maps the basis states B⊗B ≡ {|A〉⊗|B〉 : |A〉, |B〉 ∈
B} to B⊗B up to a global phase. Therefore, the random
parity/hashing test goes as follows: the two parties co-
operate and randomly apply a transform fi ∈ T for each
share of their entangled quantum state they obtain in
step 3. Then they apply the register-wise generalized C-
NOT operations to a number of randomly selected pairs
of their resultant entangled quantum states. Finally, they
measure the outcome of their final target quantum regis-
ter along the computational basis. They continue only if
their measurement result is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that their share of quantum particles are all in the
state |Φ〉. And if they continue, they apply suitable trans-
formations gi ∈ T on their remaining shares of quantum
states so as to bring them back to the state |Φ〉. Clearly,
this random parity checking procedure is a direct gener-
alization of that used in Ref. [4].
APPENDIX C: THE ACTION OF F
Here I show that F|0〉L =
∑q−1
k=0 |k〉L˜. The proof of
F|0〉L˜ =
∑q−1
k=0 |k〉L is similar. Recall that F denotes the
collective action of |a, b〉 7−→ ωmiabq |a, b〉 by the ith player
on their share of the encoded quantum registers, where
mi ∈ Fq satisfies the system of equations
∑n
i=1mi = 1
and
∑n
i=1miyi =
∑n
i=1 miy
2
i = · · · =
∑n
i=1 miy
n−1
i = 0.
Thus,
F|a0〉L
=
q−1∑
a1,a2,...,ad−1,b0,b1,...,bn−1=0
ω
∑
n
i=1
∑d−1
j=0
∑n−1
k=0
miajbky
j+k
i
q
n⊗
i=1
|b0 + b1yi + · · ·+ bn−1yn−1i 〉 . (C1)
Summing over a1 in Eq. (C1) gives bn−1 =
0. And then summing over a2 gives bn−2 = 0.
And inductively, I conclude that Eq. (C1) becomes∑
b0,b1,...,bn−d
ωa0b0q
⊗n
i=1 |b0 + b1yi + · · · + bn−dyn−di 〉.
Hence, by putting a0 = 0, I obtain F|0〉L =
∑q−1
k=0 |k〉L˜,
which is our required result.
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